Although espionage is generally associated with national security, all governments face the threat of espionage where foreign intelligence services seek to obtain access to information that is advantageous to the interests of their country.
Attempts to obtain information can be pre-planned and involve careful targeting of particular employees. Alternatively, information collection attempts can be entirely opportunistic.
Reporting attempts by foreign government officials or people who may have links to foreign governments is the first line of defence against potential espionage and allows appropriate action to be taken to lessen the risk of harm to the interests of Australian Governments.
6.1 Purpose of the protocol
This Protocol for reporting suspicious contacts helps Victorian Government officials be aware of the risk of potential intelligence activities, particularly by foreign governments and provide a means to report such activity. Contact reporting assists ASIO, through the contact reporting scheme, advise the Commonwealth Government about the threat of foreign espionage to Australian interests, and if necessary, Victoria Police, to take appropriate action.
6.2 Targeting of state government officials
State government officials can be targeted by foreign governments because they have access to national security or other sensitive national government information or to state government information that is of interest to a foreign government.
6.3 Types of information is likely to be targeted
Highly sought-after information does not need to be sensitive or classified. Any information not normally in the public domain may be used to the advantage of a foreign entity to the detriment of Australia and Australian interests.
Official advice suggests that the following types of information are sought by foreign intelligence services:
- information on defence technology
- communications and information technology
- science and technology
- political information
- economic information
- commercial information
- private information, intellectual property or business secrets that could cause harm or embarrassment if obtained by a third party.
Indicators that may arouse suspicion include:
- an inordinate interest in your official, social or personal activities
- a fascination or strong interest with a particular aspect of your work
- introduction to another person who takes a similar strong interest
- encouragement to participate in questionable or illegal activity
- offers of inappropriate hospitality or gifts.
6.4 When to complete a contact report
Employees should complete a contact report where they have contact with anyone, including foreign nationals, that seems suspicious, unusual or persistent in anyway or becomes ongoing.
Suspicious, unusual or persistent contact by foreign government officials or people who have direct links to a foreign government agency may be an attempt to obtain security or official information. Such contact could occur within Australia or overseas by individuals or groups, and in official or social circumstances.
Contact may be official, as part of a person’s role, social or incidental. It is not necessary to report contact as part of official meetings provided a formal corporate record (e.g. meeting minutes) is produced detailing the topics discussed. However, employees should complete a contact report where anyone, including a foreign national, seeks to establish social contact outside of official meetings, for example, through:
- invitations to attend functions
- written correspondence
- sport & recreation activities
- overseas travel
- visits to embassies, consulates or involvement with trade missions or other international events
- membership of international clubs, institutes, professional associations or friendship societies
- email requests
- phone calls – including unsolicited phone calls where the caller has obtained the employee’s details from an internet site
- training or study (e.g. language classes)
- social networking sites
- introductions via a third party.
Legitimate contact with foreign officials that might be required for your job does not need to be reported and this protocol is not intended to restrict legitimate official contact with foreign governments.
6.5 Submitting a suspicious contact report
Suspicious foreign contact may be reported to the Director, CSEMB. If required, the contact report may be made in writing, either by email or official report.
To request a Contact Report Form, contact the Manager, Protective Security, DPC.
6.6 Information to include in the contact report
- time, date and location of the contact/s
- name and nationality of the foreign contact and their official position, if known
- how the contact occurred, including how it was initiated and the occasion or function
- a summary of the conversation/s that occurred and any specific questioning or areas of interest
- any follow up activities that may have been arranged or other relevant information, such as documents provided, or undertakings made.
Suspicious foreign contacts should be reported even if no official information has been disclosed as the reporting can be used to inform broader patterns of contacts and suspicious behaviour.
You may also consider informing your Manager or the designated security officer in your department or agency.
6.7 After a contact report is submitted
The details of the reported contact will be assessed. If appropriate, the details of the contact report will be provided to ASIO and Victoria Police.
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